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The drastic decline in profits of domestic trunk airlines after the
introduction of jet service in 1959 brought many complaints from
the airlines and financial columnists. In the winter of 196 1—62, when the
clamor was loudest, one analyst said that the airlines "as a whole are
seriously sick, perhaps almost as much as their rivals, the railroads." 1
Mostexplanations of low profits centered on "CAB-induced over-
competition" 2and"an abrupt slowdown in the growth of passenger
traffic."In other words, it was assumed that lower profits were
caused by a decline in revenues relative to costs, and not much attention
was given to the possibility that costs were higher than necessary. But
some of the airlines were making substantial profits, and at the same
time there was considerable intercarrier variation in the level of average
cost. A curious observer would notice, for example, that in 1960 the
average cost of the operations of Continental Airlines was 74 per cent
of that at United Air Lines. Was this inevitable? Were all intercarrier
cost differences dependent on route structure, fleet structure, and
other economic variables over which management had no control, or
could more skillful managerial cost control have substantially lowered
costs and raised profitsThe economist wonders: do the inefficient
firms, protected by the CAB from price competition with their more
efficient rivals, penalize the public by choosing to petition for fare
increases instead of putting more effort into cost control?
NOTE: This paper was originally submitted in April 1962 as part of a senior honors
thesis at Harvard College.
Forbes, January 1, 1962, P. 34.
2TheNew York Times, January 8, 1962, p. 81.
Ibid., December 13, 1961, p. 13.
These questions should interest the Civil Aeronautics Board, which has been
requested to grant important mergers on the ground that a more highly con-
centrated industry will be better able to make a profit.62 AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
"Managerial efficiency" is not often discussed in empirical micro-
economic work.It is usually necessary in theoretical writings to treat
managerial talent as a constant."Economic Theory often simply
assumes that the individual businessman will find and use the lowest
cost method of production.""We must assume that it is not the case
that a few firms, managed by men of superior gifts, can and will continue
to attract the small number of superior managers, and thus will be
enabled to outperform all rivals in all fields." 6Butperhaps this
assumption has been too rigidly retained in empirical work; even when
managerial efficiency is mentioned, the difficulties involved in quan-
tifying it scare most authors away. Caves, in his recent industry study,
thinks that although some inefficiency may be lurking about, "the
extent of the inadequacy of the airlines' performance due to inefficiency
is impossible to measure."
What statistical techniques are appropriate to quantify the elusive
concept of managerial efficiency? In the first place, there is no general
airline industry cost function to work with. As Caves shows, every
writer who has tried to compute such a function by multiple regression
analysis has failed, primarily because the sample is small and the
relevant variables are many.8 However, while computation of a general
cost function has failed, it is possible to disaggregate reported costs
into separate accounting cost categories. The working hypothesis of
this paper is that after elimination of intercarrier cost differences due
to identifiable economic variables over which management has no
control, there remains a substantial residual in each cost category which
can be statistically related to differences in managerial efficiency. We
should expect effective cost control to be consistently applied by some
managements in each cost category, and some managements, likewise,
to be consistently inefficient—hence we shall be looking for evidence
that the ranking of the carriers' "adjusted" costs (i.e., after elimination
of differences dependent on identifiable economic variables) in each
category should be similar.
This study is static. Since 1960 was the first full year of jet operations,
no earlier period is suitable for analysis; nothing later than the third
quarter of 1961 was available when the statistical work was done in
early 1962.Furthermore, important strikes made an analysis of the
H. Thomas Koplin, "Public Utilities and Transportation," American Economic
Review, May 1961, p. 335.
6C.Kaysen and D. Turner, Anti-Trust Policy, Cambridge, 1959, p. 9.
R. E. Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators, Cambridge, 1962, p. 420.
8Ibid.,pp. 63—64.AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 63
TABLE 1
AVERAGE TOTAL COST BY CARRIER, 1960—61
(centsper available ton—mile)
1960 Quarters 1961 Ouarters
let 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd
American 31.2 30.0291 29.3 320a
29.1 28.8
Braniff 29.0 28.8 29.1 28.9 30.4 30.0 28.3
Capital 35.033.0 34.6 34.2 33.9 —— ——
Continental 24.5 23.1 22.8 23.7 25.0 22.7 22.5
Delta 29.4 28.8 29.331.0 30,0 30.0 30.3
Eastern 24.8280a
25.6 25.2 27.?26.5 25.4
National 27.5 27.6 27.6 27.1 28.7822.6 22.8
Northeast 30.9 31,1 32.640.0 32.5 29.5 29.6
Northwest 26.6 24.8 25.8296a 496a 277824.9
TWA
b
32.3 29.4275 27.4 301826.1 26.3
united 34.4 30.2 28.8 29.7 30.0 29.3 28.3
Western 29.2 29.5 29.6325a 353a28•3a26.5
Source:CAB,Air CarrierTraffiø Statistics1and Air Carrier Fi-
nancial Statistics,various issues, 1960—61.
a
Carrier was affected by a strike during this period.
b
Capital figures from April 1 to May 31, 1961, included with
United.
TABLE 2
AVERAGE CARRIER COST BY CATEGORY, THIRD QUARTER, 1961
(cents per available ton—mile)
AircraftProne—General
Flying Passen— and tion and Depre—
Opera; Mainte—gerTraffic and Adnin—cia;
tionsnanceServiceServiceSalesistrativetion
American 7.2 6.0 2.4 4.9 3.5 1.3 3,5
Braniff 8.2 5.8 2.4 5.3 2.9 1.1 2.6
Continental 6.7 4.1 1.9 2.8 2.4 1.3 3.2
Delta 8.0 5.9 2.3 4.9 3.4 .9 3.4
Eastern 7.8 4.4 2.0 3.8 3,0 1.0 3.5
National 6.8 4.2 1.4 3.4 3.0 .6 3.4
Northeast 8.4 6.0 2.4 4.8 2.8 .8 4.4
Northwest 75 4.1 2.0 2.9 2.9 1.3 4.2
TWA 7.4 5.2 2.3 3.9 3.2 1.3 4.0
United 8.1 5.0 2.1 5,1 3.5 1.0 3.5
Western 7.0 4.0 2.1 3.5 3.6 1.3 5.1
SourcezCAB,Financial andTrafficStatistics, September1961
CAB, Form41, September 30, 1961, Schedule P—9.2.
a
Costa within theflyingoperations and depreciation categories have been
rearranged from the officially reported figures.Carrierswhich lease
flightequipment report this expense as "flying operations" even though,as
asubstitute for buying equipment, it shouldbe considered equivalent to
depreciation.64 AIRLINE COSTS AND EFFICIENCY
full 1960—61 period impossible. Table 1 shows that there were only
three quarters during which strikes had no dislocating influence on cost
levels. Fortunately, an analysis limited to the last of these periods, the
third quarter of 1961, will not discriminate against any carrier or
carrier group, since during this three-month period all carriers achieved
their lowest cost levels of 1960—61 (with a few exceptions of only one-
or two-tenths of a cent). Also, by concentrating just on the summer
quarter, there will be no need to wonder to what extent unexplained
intercarrier cost differencesare due todiffering winter weather
conditions.
Table 2 shows average cost by categories for the third quarter of 1961.
Flying operations consist of fuel costs and pilots' salaries; maintenance
represents the costs of plane overhaul;passenger service includes
stewardess salaries and food; aircraft and traffic servicing is mostly
payroll for airport personnel who check in passengers, fuel planes, and
load baggage; promotion and sales represents reservations agents,
salesmen, and advertising;general and administrative covers the
central office; and depreciation includes rental of planes as well as
amortization of planes and ground equipment. Four of these categories
cannot be considered in this analysis because a carrier's cost perform-
ance therein may be related to itsmarketing success, and thus
economies might reduce revenues instead of increasing profits. These
are: passenger service, promotion and sales, general and administrative,
and depreciation (which, of course, reflects the structure and size of the
fleet each carrier has chosen for competition on its routes). But the
remaining three categories, flying operations, maintenance, and aircraft
and traffic servicing, are relatively unrelated to attracting passengers,
and so any savings from increased efficiency would increase profits.
Flying Operations
Pilot salaries and fuel are the major cost items in the flying operations
category. The average cost of these items should vary inversely with
the average length of flight hop. With costs measured per ton-mile,
the longer the flight, the greater the proportion of salary and fuel
expended in cruising, and the less spent in taxiing, landing, and taking
off.Surprisingly enough, however, almost no statistical relationship
can be established between average length of hop and average cost of
flying operations: the correlation coefficient is only —.09.
Two possible causes for intercarrier differences in average costs of
flying operations are:the varying presence of relatively economicalAIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 65
Figure1
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to
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SOURCE:CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961. Regression line calculated to be
Y=6.6+ —.0009X.
Figure 2
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to














500600 700 800 900 1000 11001200 13001400 1500
Average length of hop (miles)
SOURCE:CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961. Regression line calculated to be
Y=6.55+ —.0004X.66 AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
Figure 3
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to
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SOURCE: CABForm 41, September 30, 1961. The calculated regression line has
an upward slope, which conflicts with a priori expectations. The relatively high cost
reported by American gives the curve an upward bias, but this may be due to some
sort of inefficiency rather than to a fixed operational characteristic of the plane
itself.Since the plane should have roughly the same cost characteristics at the
relevant hop lengths of 500—900milesas its big brother, the Boeing 707, the curve
calculated for the latter has been used here.
and uneconomical planes in each. carrier's fleet (hereafter referred to as
"fleet structure"), and the differential efficiency of operating a particular
plane a particular length of flight. To distinguish between these two
possible causes, we must estimate a "normal" relation between length
of hop and average cost of flying operations for each plane type.
Figures 1 through 10 present, by plane type and by carrier, average
flying operations costs per available ton-mile (as opposed to revenue
ton-mile) plotted against the average length of hop. The charts are
arranged in a sort of reverse technological order, beginning with the
pure jets, then the prop-jets, the four-engine piston planes, and finally a
two-engine piston plane.Identification of a normal cost relation
becomes progressively more difficult as one moves from the jets to the
older planes. In fact, conventional regression analysis yields meaningful
results only for the Boeing 707 and DC-8. After that, intuition mustAIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 67
Figure 4
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to
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length of hop
SOURCE:CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961. The calculated line has an extreme
downward slope, which is illogical at the 600—800 mile length of hop relevant here.
The curve was plotted, instead, with a slope similar to, but slightly steeper than,
that of the 707, and raised upward to conform with the relatively high-cost per-
formance reported for the 880.
take over the job; for instance, the calculated regression for Figure 3,
the Boeing 720, would show costs rising with increasing length of hop!
Intercarrier deviations become extreme for Figures 5 through 10; for
instance, the three carriers using the Viscount have an almost identical
average length of hop, but widely differing costs. A mathematically
calculated curve for the Viscount would be vertical.
Most of the "normal" curves shown, then, are freehand, visual, and
inductive representations rather than precise calculations.9 Since any
estimate of individual carrier deviations from the normal will be no
more precise than the normal itself, the succeeding investigation must
be taken as a description of general tendencies only.
Table 3 shows the calculation of each carrier's deviation from the
"normal cost" of operating itsfleet.This estimate is derived by
Caves' study (ibid., p. 68) presents some general information helpful in deter-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 69
Figure 5
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to
















length of hop (miles)
SOURCE:CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961. This curve and those for the DC-6
and DC-i were difficult to draw; almost anything could be justified.It was assumed
that at some hop length in the vicinity of 100 miles the curves would become vertical,
and that constant costs would eventually be reached between 500 and 1000 miles.
Caves reports some general figures for these planes. With these in mind, the figures
for this plane, the DC-7, and DC-6 were superimposed on each other, and the
curves were drawn approximately parallel, with the DC-i highest, the DC-6 next,
and the Electra lowest.
multiplying the cost deviation for each plane type by the percentage of
service provided by that plane type. For instance, Northwest reported
7.6 cents per available ton-mile for its Lockheed Electras (Figure 5)
which flew an average hop of 356 miles; the "normal cost" at 356 miles
was approximately 6.2 cents. Since the Electra contributed 36 per cent
of Northwest's available ton-miles, the deviation of 1.4 cents is multi-
plied by .36, to obtain the .505 cent figure shown in Table 3. When
these deviations are summed for all plane types, it can be seen that
Northwest's average cost of flying operations would have been lower
by .319 cents per available ton-mile if it had flown each of its planes
at "normal cost."If we adjust each carrier's cost figures for their
deviation from "normal," we provide some clues to the explanation of
the absence of correlation between reported average cost of flying
operations and length of hop. Length of hop related to adjusted costs70 AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
Figure 6
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to

















Averagelength of hop (miles)
SouRcE:CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961. No curve was attempted here,
since all carriers report the same length of hop. Continental is taken as "normal."
yields a —.77correlation coefficient, as opposed to —.09before adjust-
ment. Most of the remaining unexplained difference is probably due
to the structure of each carrier's fleet: the normal curves indicate, for
example, that in general the Boeing 720 is cheaper to operate than the
Convair 880.
Thus we conclude that intercarrier differences in flying operation
costs are attributable to length of hop, fleet structure, and deviations
from normal cost, as shown in Table 3.But what accounts for these
deviations—why do some carriers operate more efficiently than others?
It is difficult to believe that carriers differ greatly in the gas mileage they
obtain from a particular plane type. Pilot salaries, on the other hand,
may be susceptible to cost control. Pilots are paid a flat rate per month,
with supplementary pay based on aircraft type, night flying, over-water
flying, and so on; the maximum permissible flying time is eighty-five
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Figure 7
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to
Average Length of Hop, Douglas DC-7
71
A "PILOT STAFFIt'1 THIRDQtftRTER, 1961
Flight Crew
on Payroll Column1
Mar.—Hours as of Dividedby
Required 9/301 61 Column2
(1) (2) (3)
American 280,700 2,018 139.2
Braniff 80,800 510 158.0
Continental 61,900 287 215.0
Delta 121,900 785 155.0
Ea8tern 306,900 2,334 131.6
National 73,800 447 165.0
62,800 363 172.9
Northwest 71,400 660 108.2
TWA 239,600 2,010 119.0
United 448,400 3,044 146.8
Western 57,900 353 163.8
Source:CAB Form 41, September
and T—3.
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AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
Figure 8
Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to
Average Length of Hop, Douglas DC-6
Northeost
I I I
100 200 300 400
Average length of hop (miles)
SOURCE: See note to Figure 5.
sureto schedule its pilots as close to 85 hours per month as possible,
to spread the fixed base pay over maximum pilot output. An excess of
pilots on a carrier's payroll might mean that some of the men were
receiving full base pay for substantially less than 85 hours of work.
(For instance, a former Northeast pilot cites instances of working three
hours a month while receiving full base pay.10)Second, the presence
of relatively few pilots on the payroll indicates that savings are being
made in training expense.
Table 4 presents computations
understaffing or overstaffing.
designed to indicate relative pilot
The total number of man-hours required




























Average Cost of Flying Operations Related to
Average Length of Hop, Constellation (All Models)
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SOURCE: CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961.Since only two airlines report
substantialuse of this plane, it was impossible to achieveany ideaof the "normal"
when themanydifferent modelswereviewedseparately. Herethey arecombined.
Thecurve, drawn parallel to, and between, the DC-6 and DC-7 curves, appears a
goodfit.
duringthe third quarter is divided by the total number of pilots, co-
pilots, and flight engineers on the payroll as of September 30, 1961.
(Total man-hour requirements take account of differing labor contracts
and the fact that different plane types require different numbers of men
in the cockpit.)Inspection of a scatter diagram indicates that this
"staffing index" is negatively related to the deviations from normal cost
calculated in Table 3. The fitted regression is clearly significant
y =186.8—1.12x."
(.52)
"Eastern was eliminated in this calculation.Its achievement of a substantial
deviation below "normal cost" for its fleet, despite relative pilot overstaffing, may
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SOURCE: CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961. The lower portions of this curve
are parallel to the DC-6 and DC-7 curves; the upper portions are drawn almost
vertical to represent the high average cost of stages under 100 miles. At all relevant
stage lengths shown here, the curve represents lower cost than the DC-6, because the
Convair was designed for relatively economical performance on short hops.
Although the use of freehand curves necessarily means that this
analysis is imprecise, itis tempting to calculate total cost savings
attainable through improved managerial efficiency. This will at least
show the general orders of magnitude involved. In the preceding analy-
sis, intercarrier cost differences were first adjusted for differing lengths of
hop and fleet composition. Then the residual costdifferences proved to be
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carrier as one which has a zero deviation in Table 3. The regression
line calculated above indicates that the five carriers which had deviations
above "normal" in Table 3 would have saved money if they had
achieved the same staffing index as the hypothetical "normal" carrier.
Cost savings for the five high-cost carriers are calculated in Table 5.
TABLE5
POTENTIAL COST SAVIFsXS FOR FLYIM OPERATIONS,
THIRD QUARTER, 1961
"y" Indicated
by Regression Actual Cost
(doU.ars per Savings
ton—mile) (ton—miles) (dollars)
American .00309 356,186,000 1,100,000
Braniff .00099 65,459,000 64,000
.00657 83,174,000 546,000
TWA .00536 291,521,000 1,563,000
United .00224 470,896,000 1,054,000
Source:Tables 3 and A.
Thefirst column shows the "y" indicated by the regression equation
for each carrier's reported staffing index; i.e., the average cost deviation
above normal which is related to each carrier's subnormal staffing.
This is multiplied in Table 5 by output to obtain an actual dollar figure
of potential savings for the third quarter of 1961.
Maintenance
The economic variables affecting the level of average maintenance cost
should be identical with those affecting average flying operations costs,
with the addition of expected economies of scale.Length of hop is
again revelant, since the government fixes overhaul intervals in hours
for all plane types. High average speed (achieved by relatively long
flight length) implies that a relatively large percentage of the time
between overhauls is productive. Cost levels would be affected also by
the structure of a carrier's fleet—airlines have different proportions of
planes that are relatively expensive or inexpensive to maintain. A
priori, economies of scale should l?e present, since a large carrier with
large numbers of a specific plane type would presumably be better able
fully to utilize its maintenance base, and would also make savings on
spare parts.If our hypothesis regarding differential managerial effi-
ciency is correct, we should expect the assembly-line techniques of
airplane overhaul to show substantial potential for cost control.76 AIRLINECOSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
TABLE6
AVERAGEMAINTENANCECOST AN!) OF BY CARRIER
API) TYPE, THIRD QLMTER, 1961
Lengthof MaintenanceCost
Hop (centsperavail—
Plane Type Carrier (miles) ableton—mile)









United (.1—57) 897 3.7
United (.1—75) 1,162 3.3
United (T—fan) 1,500 3.1





Convair 880 Delta 663 6.4
Northeast 755 4.8
815 6.0






Vickers Viscount Continental 231 7.7
Northeast 236 4.5
United 230 8.6
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Source:CAB Form 41, 30, 1961.
The correlation between average maintenance costs and length of
hop has a coefficient of .16, implying a very weak connection between
high maintenance costs and increasing length of hop. Again we must
look further and examine carrier fleets by plane type. These statistics
are presented in Table 6.
To distinguish between the structure of a carrier's fleet and its effi-
ciency in maintaining a given plane, we must consider "normal"
maintenance costs for each plane type.This is a considerably easier
task than the preceding analysis of flying operations. Table 6 shows no
relation at all between length of hop and average maintenance cost for
any type of plane. In some cases a carrier reports relatively high costs
for a relatively short flight, but always there is a carrier reporting lower
costs for about the same hop. For instance, Delta reports average
maintenance cost for the DC-8 of 6.3 cents per ton-mile for an 855-mile
trip, while Eastern achieves a 2.7 cost figure at an 800-mile trip. The
lowest-cost carriers etch a constant average cost curve over relevant
trip lengths for most plane types.'2
Eliminating length of hop, then, as an explanation of differences, we
need not develop normal curves.Instead, the lowest-cost carrier is
considered "the efficiency norm" for each plane type; Table 7 presents
deviations of costs of individual carriers from those of the lowest-cost
carrier, weighted by the percentage of output contributed by each plane
type in the carrier's fleet (thus, Table 7 is the equivalent of Table 3).
To save space, these statistics are shown in tabular form instead of graphically
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 79
For example, if American had been able to overhaul each of its plane
types as inexpensively as the lowest-cost carrier for each plane, it would
have saved about 2.8 cents per ton-mile, lowering its reported average
maintenance cost from 6.0 cents to 3.2 cents.
Adjusted costs after elimination of the "efficiency deviation" are
shown in Table 7.Relating these costs to length of hop again, the
correlation coefficient is —.45, as compared to .16 before adjustment
for differences in efficiency.The structure of each carrier'sfleet
probably accounts for much of the remaining intercarrier difference.
Northeast, Delta, and TWA could have improved their standing, for
instance, by having ordered the Boeing 720 instead of the Convair 880
as their medium-range jet.Braniff flies the same selection of planes as
American, but its shorter average trip length (dictated by its route
structure) forces it to fly a much greater percentage of its output at
unproductive low speeds.
Is this analysis reasonable? The individual carrier deviations for
each plane type bear a marked resemblance to deviations from the
"normal" curves calculated for flying operations. The .86 correlation
coefficient between deviations in flying operations and maintenance is
strikingly high, indicating that cost control is a talent which certain
carriers apply with equal success to both flying operations and main-
tenance costs. Table 8 shows that maintenance deviations are strongly
related to the productivity of maintenance labor, just as flying operations
deviations are related to a "pilot staffing index." The data in Table 8
yield a linear regression given by the equation:
y =2.49—.0000145x.'3
(.0000063)
Potentialcost savings are calculated in Table 9. Let us postulate an
"efficient" carrier which repairs each of its planes as efficiently as the
lowest-cost actually reported performance (i.e., this hypothetical carrier
has a zero deviation in Table 7). The regression line calculated above
indicates that carriers would have saved money if they had achieved
the maintenance employee productivity of the postulated zero-deviation
carrier. In Table 9 the first column shows the "y" calculated from the
regression equation for each carrier's reported level of maintenance
productivity. This is multiplied by output to obtain an actual dollar
figure of potential savings for the third quarter of 1961.





Available Ton—Miles "Efficient" Cost
Divided by Mainte— of Maintenance














Source:Cot. 1 fromCAB Form41, September 30, 1961,
ScheduleP40.Col. 2 fromTable7.
TABLE 9
COST FOR MAINTENANCE,THIRDQUARTER, 1961
"y" Indicated
by Maintenance
Cost Regression Actual Output
(dollars per (thousands of Cost Savings
ton—mile) ton—miles) (thousand dollars)
American .0144 356,186 5,129
Braniff .0161 65,459 1,053
Continental .0074 66,878 494
Delta .0140 122,169 1,710
National .0062 88,210 547
Northeast .0132 48,860 645
Northwest .0109 83,174 906
TWA .0124 291,521 3,614
United .0152 470,896 7,157
Western .0046 62,544 300
Source:Tables 7 and 8.AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 81
Aircraft and Traffic Servicing
The aircraft and traffic servicing payroll includes most of the airline
personnel at the airport. A relatively long hop should be related to low
average cost in this category, since a long flight requires more or
less the same airport operations as a short one. Different airports may
have differing pay scales; some very large airports may require extra
personnel because the check-in area is a long distance from the plane
boarding area—thus an airline's costs may be affected by the varying
requirements of its particular set of airports. Since the costs of cleaning,
fueling, and checking a plane are greater at the end of a flight than at
intermediate stops, an airline with a relatively large number of dead-end
route segments should have a cost disadvantage. Differing managerial
efficiency in cost control may also explain some intercarrier variation
in the average cost of aircraft and traffic servicing.
Relating length of hop to average cost in this category yields a + .30
correlation coefficient, although there is an a priori presumption of a
negative relation.But Table 10 looks strangely familiar. American,
Braniff, TWA, and United, identified earlier as relatively inefficient in
the flying operations and maintenance categories, again show higher
costs and longer hops than Continental, Eastern, National, and
TABLE10
RELATIONOFAVERAGE LENGTh OF HOP TOAVERAGE
COST OFAIRCRAFT PNDTRAFFIC SERVICING,
THIRDQUARTER, 1961
AverageCost
Average of Aircraft and
Length Traffic Servicing













Source:CAB Form 41, September 30, 1961, Schedule
T-.3; CAB, fraffioStatietice, and Financial Statistics,
variousissues.82 AIRLINECOSTS ANDMANAGERIAL
TABLE11
AVERAGE COST OF AIRCRAFT AND TRAFFIC SERVICING BY CARRIER,
THIRD QUARTER, 1961
Aircraft and
Traffic Serv— Cost Per
icing Cost Seats Seat
(thousands Departing Departing
of dollars) (thousands) (dollars)
American 16,442 3.34
Braniff 2,871 1,832 1.57
Continental 2,119 1,282 1.65
Delta 5,037 3,003 1.67
Eastern 10,959 7,222 1.52
National 2,863 1,681 1.70
Northeast 2,059 1,362 1.51
Northwest 2,621 1,651 1.59
TWA 9,643 3,386 2.85
United 19,935 8,864 2.25
Western 1,855 1,418 1.31
Source:cAB Fortn 41, September 30, 1961, Schedules
P—9.2 and T—4; Official Airline Guide @ick Reference
Edition, July 1, and Appendix A.
Western,which were efficient performers in the previous analysis. Is it
possible that managerial cost control will again explain the illogical
relation between average cost and length of hop?It is possible to
isolate the effect of cost control from intercarrier differences in route
structure?
We can extract trip length from average cost by changing our output
denominator. Until now, output has been measured in available ton-
miles.Airport operations, however, are better measured by "seats
departing"—the product of departures and available sets per plane.
This measure accounts simultaneously for frequency of operations and
the size of planes used at each particular airport. We can account for
the high cost of servicing turnaround flights by classifying each airline
station as "turnaround," "through," or "mixed," and treating each
type separately. Table 11 shows the wide variation among the carriers
in average cost per "departing seat"—note that American's cost is more
than twice Eastern's!
The analysis of flying operations and maintenance costs developed
"normal" or "efficient" costs for each plane type in an attempt to sepa-
rate the effects of managerial cost control and fleet structure. The same
technique can be applied to aircraft and traffic servicing, to separate
the effects of route structure and managerial efficiency, although the
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separate airline station operations producing 8,600 departures per day,
or 475,000 departing seats).When two or more airlines serve an
airport with the same type or operation (turnaround, mixed, or
through), the carrier/type with the lowest average cost is considered
"normal." Thus, in Table 12, United has the lowest average cost,
of the mixed carriers at Cleveland. Therefore S2.08 per "departing
seat" is considered the efficient cost for the other mixed carriers,
American and TWA. Similarly, Northwest's performance is the better
of the two through operations, so its cost is considered efficient for
Eastern (the other through operation). When a carrier is the only one
of its type serving a particular airport, its costs can be compared to a
regional model—the airline station of the same size and type achieving
the lowest cost in a three- or four-state region.
When we follow the procedure of Table 12 for all 254airports(the
detailed results are too bulky to be shown in detail), we obtain the
totals shown in Table 13. At one extreme, American (quite consistently
the "inefficiency champion") spent $8,763,000 more than the "efficient
cost" of operating its set of airport stations. This means that its actual
costs were more than twice as much as the "efficient cost." Western,
on the other hand, exceeded efficient cost by only 7 per cent.
Route structure explains much of the variation in average "adjusted
cost" (cot. 3 in Table 13). An examination of the raw statistics showed
that costs are relatively higher at large airports, and also at terminal
stations. A crude "route structure index," the percentage of output
provided in large airports (more than 300,000 seats departing in the
third quarter of 1961) multiplied by the percentage of output produced
in terminal stations, has a .66 rank correlation with adjusted cost.
This is shown in Table 14.
To further check our original assumptions, we again tested the
relation of average cost to length of hop. "Raw" cost showed an
illogical.30 correlationcoefficient;adjusted cost yields a —.76
coefficient.As another support for the consistency of the analysis,
the computed average deviations show a strong negative relation to
airport output per airport employee, as shown in Table 15.The
regression line relating aircraft and traffic servicing deviations to
airport employee productivity isy =2.214—.00126x.As noted in the
(.00029)
analyses of flying operations and maintenance, inefficiency seems to be
a matter of overstaffing. The data strongly support the claim that a
particular management is consistently efficient or inefficient across
several cost categories.The carrier standing in aircraft and traffic84 AIRLINECOSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
TABLE12
CALCULATION OF "EFFICIENT" COST OF AIRCRAFT AND TRAFFIC
SERVICING AT CLEVELAND, THIRDQUARTER,1961
AmericanEasternNorthwest TWAUnited
A.Type of operation Mixed ThroughThroughMixedMixed
B.Seats departing (thousands) 102.2 141.5 54.4 23.6434.2
C.Cost (thousand dollars) 253.0 169.5 50.6 73.0 903.0
D.Average cost (line C
divided by line B) 2.48 1.20 .93 3.09 2.08
E."Efficient cost" 2.08 .93 .93 2.08 2.08
Average cost deviation
(line D minus line E) .40 .27 .00 1.01 .00
C.Total deviation (line B
times line thousand
dollars) 41,0 38.2 23.8
Source:See Table 11 and Appendix A.
TABLE 13





Total by Seats by Seats
Deviation Departing Departing
(thousand dollars) (dollars) (dollars)
(1) (2) (3)
American 8,763 1.78 1.56
Braniff 759 .41 1.16
Continental 456 .36 1.29
Delta 1,018 .34 1.33
Eastern 2,291 .32 1.20
National 798 .47 1.23
Northeast 231 .17 1.34
Northwest 353 .21 1.38
TWA 3,440 1.02 1.83
United 6,969 .78 1.47
Western 131 .09 1,22
Source:See Table 12 andAppendixA.AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 85
TABLE 1k









in Large Airports around StationsColumn2 (dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
American 69 22 1,520 1.56
Braniff 50 14 700 1.16
Continental 40 28 1,120 1.29
Delta 60 18 1,080 1.33
Eastern 60 19 1,140 1.20
National 62 27 1,670 1.23
Northeast 65 37 2,400 1.34
Northwest 68 20 1,360 1.38
TWA 80 31 2,420 1.83
United 68 21 1,430 1.47
Western 48 25 1,200 1.22
Source:The first two columns were computed from the basic data re-
ferred to in Table 13 and Appendix A.Col, 4 repeats col. 3 of Table 13.
aHere output is in terms of seats departing, not available ton—miles.
TABLE15
A COMPARISON OF AIRPORT EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY WITh AIRCRAFT
AND TRAFFICSERVICING COST DEVIATIONS
Column1
Seat8 Airport Dividedby Cost
Departing Personnel Column2 Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amnerican 4,927,000 6,184 797 1.78
Braniff 1,832,000 1,406 1,302 .41
Continental 1,282,000 801 1,600 .36
Delta 3,003,000 2,765 1,085 .34
Eastern 7,222,000 4,255 1,690 .32
National 1,680,000 1,269 1,320 .47
Northeast 1,362,000 913 1,495 .17
Northwest 1,651,000 1,083 1,525 .21
TWA 3,385,000 4,416 765 1.02
United 8,864,000 6,559 1,310 .78
Western 1,418,000 801 1,720 .09
Source:Col. 1, see Table 11; col. 2, CAB Form 41, Schedule
P—10, Lines 6126.1, 6226.1, 6326.1, 6126.2, 6226.3, 6226.4;
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TABLE16
ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS POSSIBLE IN THE AIRCRAFT AND
TRAFFIC SERVICINGCATEGORY,THIRD QUARTER, 1961
Dollar Deviation Dollar
Indicatedby Output Cost
Regression (Seats Departing) Savings
(1) (2) (3)
1.21 4,497,000 5,441,000
Braniff .57 1,832,000 1,044,000
Continental .20 1,282,000 256,000
Delta .85 3,003,000 2,552,000
Eastern .09 7,222,000 649,000
National .55 1,681,000 925,000
Northeast .33 1,362,000 449,000
Northwest .29 1,651,000 478,000
TWA 1.25 3,386,000 4,232,500
United .56 8,864,000 4,963,000
Western .05 1,418,000 71,000
Source:Tables 13 and 15.
servicingdeviations shows a .80 rank correlation with the average
carrier ranking in the flying operations and maintenance deviations.
We again postulate an "efficient" carrier which services each of its
airports at the minimum achieved cost for an operation of its type.
(Note that Western is not far from achieving a perfectly efficient
performance.)The regression line calculated above indicates that
carriers would have saved money if they had achieved the airport
employee productivity of the postulated zero-deviation carrier. Col. 1
of Table 16 shows the "y" calculated from the regression equation for
each carrier's reported level of airport employee productivity. This is
multiplied by airport output to obtain, as before, an actual dollar figure
of potential savings for the third quarter of
Conclusion
Clearly this investigation has revealed some rather extraordinary figures.
On the assumption that inefficiency shows no seasonal variation, the
14Someof the high-cost performances in Table 16 may, to some extent, reflect
sound long-run marketing strategy. For instance, extra people on the airport staff
may be able to speed up check-inproceduresor aircraft servicing during periods of
peak traffic.Or, simply, having a large number of employees at the airport may
improve an airline's marketing "image." But it is curious indeed that Continental,
which maintains fewer airport personnel per departure-seat than its "high-cost"
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quarterly savings calculated above for each cost category can be
translated into an annual total of $176 million, as shown in the first
column of Table 17. Table 17 also shows the potential improvement of
profit margins and rates of return, on the assumption that potential
economies in the three cost categories discussed above would not
affect revenues and thus could be directly applied to operating profit.
The industry's rate of return, on these assumptions, could have been
more than tripled by more effective application of cost control.
Let us recall that the preceding analysis involved arbitrary assump-
tions and freehand curves, and to that extent the figures in Table 17
should be viewed with caution.It would be fair to conclude, however,
TABLE17
NET PROFITS AND RATES OF RETURN BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENT














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
American 44.9 8.7 30.2 5.02 10.49
Braniff 8.7 0.7 4.9 3.71 10.09
Continental 2.9 1.]. 2.5 6.38 8.43
Delta 16.4 4.1 12.0 7.81 16.50
Eastern 2.6 —6.2 —5.0 .04 .53
National 5.3 —5.0 —2.5 —3.96 .00
Northeast 4.2 —11.8 —7.6 —51.70—29.03













Western 12 0.5 1.1 3.35 4.44
Total 176.4 —19.2 67.5 2.16 7.05
Source
Col. 1:Savings for each airline were added from Tables 5, 9, and 16,
and then were divided by the percentage of annual costs incurred in
the third quarter, from CAB, Report of Air Carrier
Firuincial Statiotice, September, 1961.
Col. 2:Ibid.
Col. 3:Because operating savings would be taxed at the 52 per cent
corporate tax rate, 48 per cent of col. 1 has been added to col. 2.
In the case of Northeast, taxes are not deducted because of that
carrier's large outstanding tax credit.
Cols. 4 and 5:Rate of return is the sum of net profit after taxes
plus interest charges, divided by investment.•The figures for each
carrier's interest charges and investment are taken from ibid.
aUnited,s figures include those of Capital for the period prior to
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that there are differences between the cost levels of the various carriers
which, after adjustment for identifiable economic variables, show a
reasonably strong statistical relation to overstaffing. Every statistician
knows, of course, that merely stating a statistical correlation does not
prove a relation of cause and effect. Nevertheless, some field work has
convinced this author that managerial laxity is an important cause of
the various poor performances shown in Table 17.
Managerial inefficiency could be due to simple lack of concern with
costs; possibly costs are considered "determined" by fleet and route
structures so that management makes no effort to keep costs down.
Or, again, it is possible that management realizes the importance of
cost control but exercises it ineffectively. This author has found each of
these attitudes in his contacts with airline management.
At "Everywhere Airlines" (for obvious reasons, names of airlines
criticized have been changed), one of the worst performers inthe
preceding analysis, management officials interviewed seemed relatively
unconcerned about costs; the main emphasis was on the need for fare
increases.Instead of comparing the poor cost performance of their
company to the competition, "Everywhere" men seemed to look at
their problems either in isolation or as "general industry problems."
When asked bluntly why Continental, for example, achieved a much
lower average cost level, an "Everywhere" management man answered
lamely: "It (Continental) is just a small airline which hasn't grown up
yet." This comment, with its implications of diseconomies of scale, is
not only meaningless in terms of the statistics presented above, but
almost amusing considering the repeated comments at "Everywhere"
that low profits were some sort of inevitable and uncontrollable plague
wrought by disappointing demand, bad weather, and the CAB.'5
"Columbia Airlines" is also a poor performer in our statistical
analysis.In this light it is interesting to examine the "Columbia"
treasurer's explanation of Continental's low costs:
"What are the factors limiting [Columbia] and other lines from
lowering their costs to the per ton-mile achieved by Continental?
1. A common sense balance between equipment utilization and load
factor.
2. Differences in equipment types, average trip length, station locations.
3. Extent of obsolete piston fleet.
4. Maintenance policy differences—progressive versus deferred major
overhaul.
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Continental has achieved a ton-mile cost lower than the industry
principally through higher utilization....Iquestion Continental's
method of achieving lower costs as an industry panacea.It may
eventually be Continental's undoing." 16
Thisstatement supports our statistical suspicions;every factor
mentioned except "maintenance policy differences" has been accounted
for in our analysis of deviations from efficient performance. Utilization
has been eliminated as a matter of concern by limiting our attention to
two variable cost categories—flying operations and maintenance—and
one category, aircraft and traffic servicing, which is unrelated to actual
airplane costs. Differences in equipment types were accounted for by
analyzing each plane type separately. Average trip length (length of
hop) was adjusted for in flying operations, irrelevant in maintenance,
or eliminated in aircraft and traffic servicing.Station locations were
accounted for by taking individual stations or regional models as
efficiency norms in the analysis of aircraft and traffic servicing. "Extent
of obsolete piston fleet" is the same thing as differences in equipment
types.Attributing cost differences to Columbia's deferred major
overhaul as opposed to Continental's progressive maintenance proves
nothing, as most of the efficient carriers in the maintenance category
use deferred major overhaul. Certainly all these factors have something
to do with Columbia's high cost level, but they do not disprove the
implication of our analysis that Columbia could have saved a great deal
of money by improving its cost control.
Another possible reason for managerial inefficiency is that, despite
recognition of the need for improved cost control, the wrong techniques
are used. The author witnessed this in detail during the past several
years. "Economy" often seemed to be a matter of skimping on pencils,
ticket stock, and paper clips, instead of that most important component
of costs—people.Another factoris management's misuse of the
quota system: in many cases the personnel quota develops from year
to year by adding one year's expected traffic growth to the actual
number of employees from the previous year.In this way an initial
distortion, or a bad forecast, leads to overstaffing. Thus, in one case,
even though ticket and reservations agents were sitting around with
no work to do, the office manager was congratulating himself on being
"two under quota" (the reservations manager was less blind;he
admitted that he had hired fifty too many reservations agents). Another
wasteful factor is the excess of supervisory personnel.Above an
Froma letter to the author, dated January 2, 1962.90 AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
ordinary ticket counter salesman at this same office was: one senior
agent, three supervisors, one "chief," one "assistant to the manager of
city ticket offices," and the "manager of city ticket offices," not to
mention the "ticket agent trainer."
In contrast to all this was a visit to Continental Airlines.The
management seemed to pride itself on its low costs and require of itself
that it lead the industry in low-cost performance.17 On the desk of each
executive was a company booklet (prepared monthly) comparing
Continental's costs to those of other airlines.Continental keeps
station costs down in small cities by, for example, sending employees
home between flights, and in large stations by handling work for
international carriers between peaks inits own operations.The
budgeting director, in contrast to the officials from "Everywhere" and
"Columbia" quoted above, was well aware that the principal way to
keep costs low is to hire as few employees as possible.
This field work, then, provides a reasonable explanation of the
statistical analysis. The inefficient carriers explain their unsatisfactory
profits in terms of low revenues and CAB-induced over-competition,
and do not concentrate enough on cost control. When these carriers
do examine their costs, they explain their relative inefficiency in terms
of fixed economic variables like route structure, over which management
has no short-run control. Finally, on the basis of one close observation,
it may be suggested that when the management of an inefficient airline
does sporadically try to control costs, it concentrates too much on
equipment and not enough on people.
Even if the industry had been able to save a third of the estimated
potential cost savings calculated in Table 17, its rate of return would
have been almost doubled. This raises an important question for the
Civil Aeronatuics Board the next time it is asked by certain carriers to
approve a merger or a fare increase because of low reported profits.
Perhaps, in requesting fare increases, the inefficient carriers are penal-
izing the public. Perhaps more diligent cost control could eventually
lead to a lower fare level.It is interesting in this connection that
United, which recently has been a price leader upward, performed
poorly in the statistical analysis of managerial efficiency, while Conti-
nental, a price leader downward, performed well.If efficient lines had
more freedom to engage in free price competition, the inefficient lines
would of necessity have to put a greater effort into cost contol or risk
going out of business. This paper is in agreement with Caves' recent
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recommendation that CAB price regulation of the domestic trunk
airlines should be abandoned.18
An additional insight into the reasons for relatively effective or
ineffective cost control comes from a close examination of each carrier's
route structure.For instance, Continental is at a disadvantage in
competing with American, TWA, and United, because Continental's
routes stop at Chicago, while the larger carriers fly farther east. Thus
Continental, on its routes west of Chicago, must subsist on local
traffic and connections, while the larger carriers can feed traffic through
from their eastern cities. To run the same flight frequencies as the
larger carriers, Continental's load factors are thereby lower, and it is
compelled to cut costs. In a similar case, Western, one of the smallest
trunklines, must compete along the west coast with United, which is the
largest private air carrier in the world and can shuttle its many planes up
and down the coast between trips to the east. Thus Western, in order
to maintain a fleet large enough to compete with United, feels compelled
to cut its costs. By the same analysis, United, American, and TWA,
inefficient performers in this analysis, with their large fleets and profit-
able long-haul high-density routes, can more easily than the smaller
lines maintain a high load factor and thus feel less pressure to control
costs. This semipsychological factor is probably more important than
any possible diseconomies of scale as an explanation of the apparent
relative efficiency of small carriers.Delta and Braniff, two other
inefficient carriers, are relatively small lines, but have a relatively high
proportion of monopoly traffic. Thus, they can easily maintain a high
load factor and feel little pressure to control costs.If the CAB is
interested in promoting a low fare level for the domestic trunk airlines,
this analysis would suggest that it should maintain, or even perhaps
increase, the present level of competition between the carriers on
important routes.
The president of a major airline recently confirmed some of the
conclusions of this paper. In our statistical analysis it was estimated
that for the year ending September 30, 1961, American Airlines could
have raised its net profit from about $9 million to about $30 million
by more effective cost control.In a recent speech, C. R. Smith,
president of American Airlines, said, "American should earn about
$35 million after interest. American is trailing some of its competitors
in doing a good job at cost control. .. wemust find a way to do our
work more economically." 19
Caves,Air Transport, Chapter 18.
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APPENDIX A.Notes on the Calculation of
Seats Departing and the Cost of Aircraft
and Traffic Servicing
The calculation of seats departing involved adding daily seats for each
station from the Official Airline Guide Quick Reference Edition (number
of seats per plane was obtained from various airlines in Boston), and
dividing by daily departures reported in the same source to obtain a
daily average number of seats per plane for each station. The resultant
figure was then multiplied by the total departures from each station
during the third quarter as reported on Schedule T-4. A possible
element of error was that several airline seating configurations were
estimated.
Costs were obtained from CAB Form 41, Schedule P-9.2;costs
listed in cols. 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 12 of this schedule were added to-
gether.Some carriers listed large expenses in their home office,
maintenance, or flight training cities which represented the costs of
system, rather than station, expense. Thus cols. 9,10, and 12 were
excluded in each carrier's home office, maintenance, and flight training
city. This had a small effect on intercarrier average cost ranking. The
rank correlation between actual aircraft and traffic servicing expense
and the adjusted figures is .86.
American's extraordinary cost at Fort Worth is discounted—some
stewardess training or other system expense must have been reported.
Eastern's New Orleans cost figures were missed when these statistics
were copied at the CAB.
COMMENT
CHARLES J. ZWICK, The RAND Corporation
I found this to be a very interesting and persuasive paper. Although
much of the empirical analysis is shaky, due to inadequate data and
the "first attempt" nature of the work, it does, I believe, represent an
important contribution. My comments will be focused on the limit-
ations of this first analysis and will include suggestions for improvement.
I suspect that Gordon would in fact agree with most, if not all, of them.
The first point I would like to make concerns Gordon's equating of
managerial efficiency with cost control.Certainly this is one aspect,
and an important aspect, of managerial efficiency, but it is not the only
one. He eliminates, for example, the whole general area of salesAIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY 93
promotion, the material of direct interest to Kraft.Efficient firms
should be both cost-conscious and effective marketers of their product.
Secondly, it would be highly desirable to reproduce the analysis using
additional quarters of data. Gordon's analysis is based on one quarter's
data. He extrapolates these results to an annual basis, assuming no
differences with regard to seasonality.I would expect significant
seasonal impact on cost performance since there are, as Kraft recognizes
in his paper, important seasonal differences in demand.
I thought Gordon handled his data, given its limitations, with
prudence. One way to increase our confidence in his conclusions is to
reproduce the analysis with new data.I am sure unexpected analysis
innovations would develop so that reproducing this analysis over a
number of periods should increase significantly our confidence in the
results.I would, however, like also to propose an alternative approach.
Gordon infers standard or normal costs for an airline from historical
data; an alternative procedure would be to model a carrier's operations,
and cost these operations, using standard cost factors. This approach
has, of course, been used in a number of situations,1 and we do have
fairly good data on costs of specific air carrier operations.I believe
that in the long run this would be a more fruitful way of developing
normal costs for an airline than inferring these from historical data.
The alternative approach, of course, would be more expensive than
the one employed by Gordon, and we therefore have the troublesome
question of which approach is preferred on a cost-effectiveness basis.
I suspect, however, that Gordon has done such a good job of pointing
out that significant amounts of money are involved that we could make
a case that a more refined costing approach would be worth the extra
expense, especially if we could get a public agency, such as the CAB, to
conduct these analyses in a continuing and competent manner.
Lastly, I want to suggest that being completely preoccupied with
labor efficiency could lead a carrier into trouble. Gordon correctly
points out that effective cost control is practically identical with efficient
use of labor. It is clear, however, that one can push labor efficiency too
far, as there is a stochastic element to producing air carrier services.
Viewing the process from a queuing model point of view, there is an
optimal waiting situation. Clearly, we do not want expensive equipment
always queued up waiting for personnel—nor do we want to lose
passengers because personnel unavailability affects schedule reliability.
There is, in short, a balance in waiting times that must be struck in such
1 See, for example, R. G. Bressler, Jr., City Milk Distribution,Cambridge,1952.94 AIRLINE COSTS AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
a situation. There are' real world examples where excessive concern
with personnel utilization has lead to undesirable performance con-
sequences.
Management efficiency has been considered, as Gordon points out,
that part of firm behavior that is beyond the scope of economics. He
has made an important contribution by indicating that it can be
attacked in a systematic and useful way.I quite agree with his policy
conclusion that it would be useful to generate these data on a continuing
basis and tohave them available in rate-making cases. We all can end
our discussion, as Gordon did, with the hope that some day we may be
so bold as to allow price competition as one form in which management
efficiency could be reflected.
Over-all,Ibelieve that itis important to stimulate additional
empirical cost efforts in the transport industries.Important policy
decisions will be facing us with regard to transportation over the next
decade.It would be comforting to know that we have a significant
body of cost analysis behind us when making these decisions. Outside
of agriculture, detailed analysis of cost functions has been largely
neglected.